Apr 17, 2022 | Uncategorized

,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, ue to humans, and definitive of what it is to be a member of the biological species Homo sapiens. In particular, Hull argues that such “essential sameness of human beings” is “temporary, contingent and relatively rare” in biology.[87] He argues that variation, insofar as it is the result of evolution, is an essential feature of all biological species. Moreover, the type of variation which characterizes a certain species in a certain historical moment is “to a large extent accidental”[87] He writes:[87]: 3 Periodically a biological species might be characterized by one or more characters which are both universally distributed among and limited to the organisms belonging to that species, but such states of affairs are temporary, contingent and relatively rare. Hull reasons that properties universally shared by all members of a certain species are usually also possessed by members of other species, whereas properties exclusively possessed by the members of a certain species are rarely possessed by all members of that species. For these reasons, Hull observes that, in contemporary evolutionary taxonomy, belonging to a particular species does not depend on the possession of any specific intrinsic properties. Rather, it depends on standing in the right kind of relations (relations of genealogy or interbreeding, depending on the precise species concept being used) to other members of the species. Consequently, there can be no intrinsic properties that define what it is to be a member of the species Homo sapiens. Individual organisms, including humans, are part of a species by virtue of their relations with other members of the same species, not shared intrinsic properties. According to Hull, the moral significance of his argument lies in its impact on the biologically legitimate basis for the concept of “human rights”. While it has long been argued that there is a sound basis for “human rights” in the idea that all human beings are essentially the same, should Hull’s criticism work, such a basis – at least on a biological level – would disappear. Nevertheless, Hull does not perceive this to be a fundamental for human rights, because people can choose to continue respecting human rights even without sharing the same human nature.[87] Defences of the concept of human nature Several contemporary philosophers have attempted to defend the notion of human nature against charges that it is incompatible with modern evolutionary biology by proposing alternative interpretations. They claim that the concept of human nature continues to bear relevance in the fields of neuroscience and biology. Many have proposed non-essentialist notions. Others have argued that, even if Darwinism has shown that any attempt to base species membership on “intrinsic essential properties” is untenable, essences can still be “relational” – this would be consistent with the interbreeding, ecological, and phylogenetic species concepts, which are accepted by modern evolutionary biology.[93] These attempts aim to make Darwinism compatible with a certain conception of human nature which is stable across time. “Nomological” account (Machery) Philosopher of science Edouard Machery has proposed that the above criticisms only apply to a specific definition (or “notion”) of human nature, and not to “human nature in general”.[91] He distinguishes between two different notions: An essentialist notion of human nature – “Human nature is the set of properties that are separately necessary and jointly sufficient for being a human.” These properties are also usually considered as distinctive of human beings. They are also intrinsic to humans and inherent to their essence.[91] ORDER an A++ paper from our Verified MASTERS and DOCTORATE WRITERS: Discussion Human Nature Psychology   A nomological notion of human nature – “Human nature is the set of properties that humans tend to possess as a result of the evolution of their species.”[91] Machery clarifies that, to count as being “a result of evolution”, a property must have an ultimate explanation in Ernst Mayr’s sense. It must be possible to explain the trait as the product of evolutionary processes. Importantly, properties can count as part of human nature in the nomological sense even if they are not universal among humans and not unique to humans. In other words, nomological properties need not be necessary nor sufficient for being human. Instead, it is enough that these properties are shared by most humans, as a result of the evolution of their species – they “need to be typical”.[94] Therefore, human nature in the nomological sense does not define what it is to be a member of the species Homo sapiens. Examples of properties that count as parts of human nature on the nomological definition include: being bipedal, having the capacity to speak, having a tendency towards biparental investment in children, having fear reactions to unexpected noises.[91] Finally, since they are the product of evolution, properties belonging to the nomological notion of human nature are not fixed, but they can change over time.[94] Machery agrees with biologists and others philosophers of biology that the essentialist notion of human nature is incompatible with modern evolutionary biology: we cannot explain membership in the human species by means of a definition or a set of properties. However, he maintains that this does not mean humans have no nature, because we can accept the nomological notion which is not a definitional notion. Therefore, we should think of human nature as the many properties humans have in common as a result of evolution.[91] Machery argues that notions of human nature can help explain why that, while cultures are very diverse, there are also many constants across cultures. For Machery, most forms of cultural diversity are in fact diversity on a common theme; for example, Machery observes that the concept of a kinship system is common across cultures but the exact form it takes and the specifics vary between cultures.[95] Problems with the nomological account Machery also highlights potential drawbacks of the nomological account.[91] One is that the nomological notion is a watered-down notion that cannot perform many of the roles that the concept of human nature is expected to perform in science and philosophy. The properties endowed upon humans by the nomological account do not distinguish humans from other animals or define what it is to be human. Machery pre-empts this objection by claiming that the nomological concept of human nature still fulfils many roles. He highlights the importance of a conception which picks out what humans share in common which can be used to make scientific, psychological generalizations about human-beings.[94] One advantage of such a conception is that it gives an idea of the traits displayed by the majority of human beings which can be explained in evolutionary terms. Another potential drawback is that the nomological account of human nature threatens to lead to the absurd conclusion that all properties of humans are parts of human nature. According to the nomological account, a trait is only part of human nature if it is a result of evolution. However, there is a sense in which all human traits are results of evolution. For example, the belief that water is wet is shared by all humans. However, this belief is only possible because we have, for example, evolved a sense of touch. It is difficult to separate traits which are the result of evolution and those which are not. Machery claims the distinction between proximate and ultimate explanation can do the work here: only some human traits can be given an ultimate explanation, he argues. According to the philosopher Richard Samuels[92] the account of human nature is expected to fulfill the five following roles: an organizing function that demarks a territory of scientific inquiry a descriptive function that is traditionally understood as specifying properties that are universal across and unique to human being a causal explanatory function that offers causal explanation for occurring human behaviours and features a taxonomic function that specifies possessing human nature as a necessary and sufficient criterion for belonging to the human species Invariances that assume the understanding that human nature is to some degree fixed, invariable or at least hard to change and stable across time. Samuels objects that Machery’s nomological account fails to deliver on the causal explanatory function, because it claims that superficial and co-varying properties are the essence of human nature. Thus, human nature cannot be the underlying cause of these properties and accordingly cannot fulfill its causal explanatory role. Philosopher Grant Ramsey also rejects Machery’s nomological account. For him, defining human nature with respect to only universal traits fails to capture many important human characteristics.[90] Ramsey quotes the anthropologist Clifford Geertz, who claims that “the notion that unless a cultural phenomenon is empirically universal it cannot reflect anything about the nature of man is about as logical as the notion that because sickle-cell anemia is, fortunately, not universal, it cannot tell us anything about human genetic processes. It is not whether phenomena are empirically common that is critical in science…but whether they can be made to reveal the enduring natural processes that underly them.”[96] Following Geertz, Ramsey holds that the study of human nature should not rely exclusively on universal or near-universal traits. There are many idiosyncratic and particular traits of scientific interest. Machery’s account of human nature cannot give an account to such differences between men and women as the nomological account only picks out the common features within a species. In this light, the female menstrual cycle which is a biologically an essential and useful feature cannot be included in a nomological account of human nature.[90] Ramsey[90] also objects that Machery uncritically adopts the innate-acquired dichotomy, distinguishing between human properties due to enculturation and those due to evolution. Ramsey objects that human properties do not just fall in one of the two categories, writing that “any organismic property is going to be due to both heritable features of the organism as well as the particular environmental features the organism happens to encounter during its life.”[90] “Causal essentialist” account (Samuels) Richard Samuels, in an article titled “Science and Human Nature”, proposes a causal essentialist view that “human nature should be identified with a suite of mechanisms, processes, and structures that causally explain many of the more superficial properties and regularities reliably associated with humanity.”[92] This view is “causal” because the mechanisms causally explain the superficial properties reliably associated with humanity by referencing the underlying causal structures the properties belong to. For example, it is true that the belief that water is wet is shared by all humans yet it is not in itself a significant aspect of human nature. Instead, the psychological process that lead us to assign the word “wetness” to water is a universal trait shared by all human beings. In this respect, the superficial belief that water is wet reveals an important causal psychological process which is widely shared by most human beings. The explanation is also “essentialist” because there is a core set of empirically discoverable cognitive mechanism that count as part of the human nature. According to Samuels, his view avoids the standard biological objections to human nature essentialism. Samuels argues that the theoretical roles of human nature includes: organizing role, descriptive functions, causal explanatory functions, taxonomic functions, and invariances. In comparison with traditional essentialist view, the “causal essentialist” view does not accomplish the taxonomic role of human nature (the role of defining what it is to be human). He claims however, that no conception could achieve this, as the fulfillment of the role would not survive evolutionary biologists’ objections (articulated above by in “Criticisms of the concept of human nature”). In comparison with Machery’s nomological conception, Samuels wants to restore the causal-explanatory function of human nature. He defines the essence of human nature as causal mechanisms and not as surface-level properties. For instance, on this view, linguistic behaviour is not part of human nature, but the cognitive mechanisms underpinning linguistic behaviour might count as part of human nature. “Life-history trait cluster” account (Ramsey) Grant Ramsey proposes an alternative account of human nature, which he names the “life-history trait cluster” account.[90] This view stems from the recognition that the combination of a specific genetic constitution with a specific environment is not sufficient to determine how a life will go, i.e., whether one is rich, poor, dies old, dies young, etc. Many ‘life histories’ are possible for a given individual, each populated by a great number of traits. Ramsey defines his conception of human nature in reference to the “pattern of trait clusters within the totality of extant possible life-histories”.[90] In other words, there are certain life histories, i.e., possible routes one’s life can take, for example: being rich, being a PhD student, or getting ill. Ramsey underlines the patterns behind these possible routes by delving into the causes of these life histories. For example, one can make the following claim: “Humans sweat when they get exhausted” or one can also propose neurological claims such as “Humans secrete Adrenaline when they are in flight-fight mode.” This approach enables Ramsey to go beyond the superficial appearances and understand the similarities/differences between individuals in a deeper level which refers to the causal mechanisms (processes, structures and constraints etc.) which lie beneath them. Once we list all the possible life-histories of an individual, we can find these causal patterns and add them together to form the basis of individual nature. Ramsey’s next argumentative manoeuvre is to point out that traits are not randomly scattered across potential life histories; there are patterns. “These patterns” he states “provide the basis for the notion of individual and human nature”.[90]: 987 While one’s ‘individual nature’ consists of the pattern of trait clusters distributed across that individual’s set of possible life histories, Human Nature, Ramsey defines as “the pattern of trait clusters within the totality of extant human possible life histories”.[90]: 987 Thus, if we were to combine all possible life histories of all individuals in existence we would have access to the trait distribution patterns that constitute human nature. Trait patterns, on Ramsey’s account, can be captured in the form of conditional statements, such as “if female, you develop ovaries” or “if male, you develop testes.” These statements will not be true of all humans. Ramsey contends that these statements capture part of human nature if they have a good balance of pervasiveness (many people satisfy the antecedent of the conditional statement), and robustness (many people who satisfy the antecedent go on to satisfy the consequent). Human nature and human enhancement Main articles: Bioconservatism and Transhumanism The contemporary debate between so-called “bioconservatives” and “transhumanists” is directly related to the concept of human nature: transhumanists argue that “current human nature is improvable through the use of applied science and other rational methods.”[97] Bioconservatives believe that the costs outweigh the benefits: in particular, they present their position as a defense of human nature which, according to them, is threatened by human enhancement technologies. Although this debate is mainly of an ethical kind, it is deeply rooted in the different interpretations of human nature, human freedom, and human dignity (which, according to bioconservatives, is specific to human beings, while transhumanists think that it can be possessed also by posthumans). As explained by Allen Buchanan,[98] the literature against human enhancement is characterized by two main concerns: that “enhancement may alter or destroy human nature” and that “if enhancement alters or destroys human nature, this will undercut our ability to ascertain the good,” as “the good is determined by our nature.”[98] Bioconservatives include Jürgen Habermas,[99] Leon Kass,[100] Francis Fukuyama,[101] and Bill McKibben.[97] Some of the reasons why they oppose (certain forms of) human enhancement technology are to be found in the worry that such technology would be “dehumanizing” (as they would undermine the human dignity intrinsically built in our human nature). For instance, they fear that becoming “posthumans” could pose a threat to “ordinary” humans[102] or be harmful to posthumans themselves.[103][97] Jürgen Habermas makes the argument against the specific case of genetic modification of unborn children by their parents, referred to as “eugenic programming” by Habermas. His argument is two-folded: The most immediate threat is on the “ethical freedom” of programmed individuals, and the subsequent threat is on the viability of liberal democracy. Reasoning of the former can be formulated as the following: Genetic programming of desirable traits, capabilities and dispositions puts restrictions on a person’s freedom to choose a life of his own, to be the sole author of his existence. A genetically-programmed child may feel alienated from his identity, which is now irreversibly co-written by human agents other than himself. This feeling of alienation, resulted from“contingency of a life’s beginning that is not at [one’s] disposal,” makes it difficult for genetically-modified persons to perceive themselves as moral agents who can make ethical judgement freely and independently – that is, without any substantial or definitive interference from another agent. Habermas proposes a second threat – the undermining power of genetic programming on the viability of democracy. The basis of liberal democracy, Habermas rightfully claims, is the symmetrical and independent mutual recognition among free, equal and autonomous persons. Genetic programming jeopardizes this condition by irreversibly subjecting children to permanent dependence on their parents, thus depriving them of their perceived ability to be full citizens of the legal community. This fundamental modification to human relationship erodes the foundation of liberal democracy and puts its viability in danger.[104] The most famous proponent of transhumanism, on the other hand, is Oxford Swedish philosopher Nick Bostrom. According to Bostrom, “human enhancement technologies should be made widely available,”[97] as they would offer enormous potential for improving the lives of human beings, without “dehumanizing” them: for instance, improving their intellectual and physical capacities, or protecting them from suffering, illnesses, aging, and physical and cognitive shortcomings.[97] In response to bioconservatives, transhumanists argue that expanding a person’s “capability set” would increase her freedom of choice, rather than reducing it.[97] Allen Buchanan has questioned the relevance of the concept of human nature to this debate. In “Human Nature and Enhancement”, he argued that good but also bad characteristics are part of human nature, and that changing the “bad” ones does not necessarily imply that the “good” ones will be affected. Moreover, Buchanan argued that the way we evaluate the good is independent of human nature: in fact, we can “make coherent judgements about the defective aspects of human nature, and if those defects were readied this need not affect our ability to judge what is good”.[98] Buchanan’s conclusion is that the debate on enhancement of human beings would be more fruitful if it was conducted without appealing to the concept of human nature.[98] Tim Lewens presented a similar position: since the only notions of human nature which are compatible with biology offer “no ethical guidance in debates over enhancement”, we should set the concept of human nature aside when debating about enhancement. On the other hand, “folk”, neo-Aristotelian conceptions of human nature seem to have normative implications, but they have no basis in scientific research.[105] Grant Ramsey replied to these claims, arguing that his “life-history trait cluster” account allows the concept of human nature “to inform questions of human enhancement”.[106] Appeals to nature often fall foul of the naturalistic fallacy, whereby certain capacities or traits are considered morally ‘good’ in virtue of their naturalness. The fallacy was initially introduced by G. E. Moore in 1903, who challenged philosopher’s attempts to define good reductively, in terms of natural properties (such as desirable). Reliance on ‘the natural’ as a justification for resisting enhancement is criticised on several grounds by transhumanists, against the bioconservative motivation to preserve or protect ‘human nature’. For example, Nick Bostrom asserts “had Mother Nature been a real parent, she would have been in jail for child abuse and murder”[107] thus not worthy of unqualified protection. Similarly, Arthur Caplan opposes naturalistic objections to life extension enhancements, by claiming that:[108] The explanation of why ageing occurs has many of the attributes of a stochastic or chance phenomenon. And this makes ageing unnatural and in no way an intrinsic part of human nature. As such, there is no reason why it is intrinsically wrong to try to reverse or cure ageing. Scientific understanding See also: Evolutionary psychology and Evolution of the brain § Evolution of the human brain Science writer and journalist Matt Ridley argued that understanding human nature, and its evolution over time, requires “understanding how human sexuality evolved.”[109] Instinctual behaviour See also: Instinct § In humans Instinctual behaviour, an inherent inclination towards a particular complex behaviour, has been observed in humans. Emotions such as fear are part of human nature (see Fear § Innate fear for example). However they are also known to have been malleable and not fixed (see neuroplasticity and Fear § Inability to experience fear). Congenital fear of snakes and spiders was found in six-month-old babies.[110] Infant cry is a manifestation of instinct. The infant cannot otherwise protect itself for survival during its long period of maturation. The maternal instinct, manifest particularly in response to the infant cry, has long been respected as one of the most powerful. Its mechanism has been partly elucidated by observations with functional MRI of the mother’s brain.[111] The herd instinct is found in human children and chimpanzee cubs, but is apparently absent in the young orangutans.[112] Squeamishness and disgust in humans is an instinct developed during evolution to protect the body and avoid infection by various diseases.[113] Hormones can affect instinctual behaviour. Hormones Wiki letter w.svg This section is missing information about beneficial and potentially beneficial effects of high endogenous testosterone in men. Please expand the section to include this information. Further details may exist on the talk page. (April 2021) Testosterone Testosterone (main male sex hormone) primes several instincts, especially sexuality; also dominance, manifest in self-affirmation, the urge to win over rivals (see competitiveness), to dominate a hierarchy (see dominance hierarchy), and to respond to violent signals in men (see aggression), with weakening of empathy.[114] In men, a decrease in testosterone level after the birth of a child in the family was found, so that the father’s energies are more directed to nurturing, protecting and caring for the child.[115][116] Unduly high levels of this hormone are often associated in a person with aggressiveness, illegal behavior, violence against others, such phenomena as banditry, etc.[citation needed] This is confirmed by studies conducted in prisons.[117][118] The amount of testosterone in men may increase dramatically in response to any competition.[119] In men, the level of testosterone varies depending on whether it is susceptible to the smell of an ovulating or non-ovulatory woman (see menstrual cycle). Men exposed to the odors of ovulating women maintained a stable level of testosterone, which was higher than the level of testosterone in men exposed to non-ovulatory signals. This is due to the fact that an ovulating woman is capable of conceiving, and therefore a man who feels the smell of an ovulating woman is given a signal to sexual activity.[120] Socioeconomic context The socioeconomic environment of humans are a context which affect their brain development.[121] It has been argued that H. sapiens is unsustainable by nature – that unsustainability is an inevitable emergent property of his unaltered nature.[122] It has also been argued that human nature is not necessarily resulting in unsustainability but is embedded in and affected by a socioeconomic system that is not having an inevitable structure[123][additional citation(s) needed] – that the contemporary socioeconomic macrosystem affects human activities.[124] A paper published in 1997 concluded that humanity suffer consequences of a “poor fit” between inherited natures and “many of the constructed environments in organizational society”.[125] Designing a “cultural narrative” explicitly for living on a finite planet may be suitable for overriding “outdated” innate tendencies.[122] Human nature – which some have argued to vary to some extent per individual and in time, not be static and, at least in the future, to some extent be purposely alterable[126] – is one of the factors that shape which, how and when human activities are conducted. The contemporary socioeconomic and collective decision-making mechanisms are structures that may affect the expression of human nature – for instance, innate tendencies to seek survival, well-being, respect and status that some consider fundamental to humans[127] may result in varying product-designs, types of work, public infrastructure-designs and the distribution and prevalence of each. As with the nature versus nurture debate, which is concerned whether – or to which degrees – human behavior is determined by the environment or by a person’s genes, scientific research is inconclusive about the degree to which human nature is shaped by and manageable by systemic structures as well as about how and to which degrees these structures can and should be purposely altered swiftly globally. 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